The Ignorant Observer

Most prominent models of economic justice (and especially those proposed by Harsanyi and Rawls) are based on the assumption that impartiality is required for making moral decisions. However, although Harsanyi and Rawls agree on that, and furthermore agree on the fact that impartiality can be obtained under appropriate conditions of ignorance, they strongly disagree on the consequences of these assumptions. According to Harsanyi, they provide a justification for the utilitarian doctrine, whereas Rawls considers that they imply egalitarianism. We propose here an extension of Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem, that is based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions. We obtain a characterization of the observer's preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a linear combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria. Furthermore, this representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals' utilities are cardinally measurable and unit comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls' and Harsanyi's positions. Finally, we defend the view that a (strict) combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria provides a reasonable rule for social decisions.Impartiality, justice, decision under ignorance.

The ignorant observer

We propose an extension of Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions over individuals. We obtain a characterization of the observer's preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a convex combination of Harsanyi's utilitarian and Rawls' egalitarian criteria. This representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals' utilities are cardinally measurable and fully comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls' and Harsanyi's positions.Impartiality, Justice, Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Decision under ignorance.

The Ignorant Observer

URL des Cahiers : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/CAHIERS-MSE Voir aussi l'article basé sur ce document de travail paru dans "Social Choice and Welfare," Springer Verlag, 2008, 31 (2), pp.193-232Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques 2006.41 - ISSN 1624-0340Most prominent models of economic justice (and especially those proposed by Harsanyi and Rawls) are based on the assumption that impartiality is required for making moral decisions. However, although Harsanyi and Rawls agree on that, and furthermore agree on the fact that impartiality can be obtained under appropriate conditions of ignorance, they strongly disagree on the consequences of these assumptions. According to Harsanyi, they provide a justification for the utilitarian doctrine, whereas Rawls considers that they imply egalitarianism. We propose here an extension of Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem, that is based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions. We obtain a characterization of the observer's preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a linear combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria. Furthermore, this representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals' utilities are cardinally measurable and unit comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls' and Harsanyi's positions. Finally, we defend the view that a (strict) combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria provides a reasonable rule for social decisions.La plupart des théories économiques de la justice (notamment celles de Rawls et de Harsanyi) supposent que l'impartialité est un prérequis à toute décision d'ordre moral. Harsanyi et Rawls s'accordent de plus pour penser que l'impartialité peut être obtenue en plaçant le décideur dans des conditions d'ignorance appropriées. Cependant, ces deux auteurs déduisent de ces hypothèses des conclusions radicalement opposées : selon Harsanyi, elles conduisent à justifier l'utilitarisme, tandis que Rawls considère qu'elles justifient l'égalitarisme. Nous proposons dans cet article une extension du modèle de l'Observateur Impartial de Harsanyi qui repose sur l'idée selon laquelle l'ignorance correspond à une situation d'incertitude où toutes les distributions de probabilités sont a priori possibles. Nous obtenons une caractérisation des préférences de l'Observateur Impartial qui, sous nos hypothèses les plus restrictives, est une combinaison convexe des critères de Rawls et de Harsanyi. De plus, cette représentation a une signification éthique, dans la mesure où les utilités individuelles qu'elle agrège sont cardinalement mesurables et comparables. Ce résultat montre que l'exigence d'impartialité ne permet pas de trancher entre la position de Rawls et celle de Harsanyi. Enfin, nous défendons l'idée selon laquelle une (stricte) combinaison des critères utilitariste et égalitariste constitue une règle raisonnable pour les décisions sociales

Justice sociale et durabilité environnementale

OSInternational audienceno abstrac

De la rationalité à la raison pratique dans les actes économiques

Au-delà des modèles de comportement rationnel utilisés en théorie de la décision, l’enjeu de l’article consiste à penser l’action économique à partir de son déroulement et de la pluralité des capacités de jugement qui y sont engagées. La mise en valeur de l’intelligibilité pratique de l’action conduit à remettre en cause la conception néo-classique de l’action économique et à privilégier non pas le calcul d’économicité lié à la rationalité seulement théorique de l’action, mais plus fondamentalement le jugement de sens par lequel chacun des grands actes de la vie économique tire sa signification. À travers l’exercice du jugement de sens, c’est la dynamique des actions économiques singulières situées dans une action collective et engagée dans des configurations institutionnelles plus larges qui est rendue intelligible.Beyond rational behavior models used in decision theories, the stakes in this paper are to think about economical action from its development and from the pluralities of judgmental capacities that are involved. Highlighting action’s practical intelligibility leads to a questioning of the neoclassical conception of economical action and to privilege, not calculations of economy bound just to action’s theoretical rationality, but the judgment of meaning by which every important act of economical life acquires its signification. Through the judgment of meaning, the dynamics of singular economical actions is rendered intelligible.Jenseits der rationalen Verhaltensmodelle, die in der Entscheidungstheorie verwandt werden, sollen in dem vorliegenden Artikel die ökonomischen Aktionen in der Perspektive ihres Ablaufs und der Pluralität der darin implizierten Urteilsfähigkeiten gedacht werden. Durch das Herausarbeiten der praktischen Intelligenz der Aktion wird die neoklassische Aktionstheorie infrage gestellt, wobei weniger das an die theoretische Dimension der Aktionsrationalität gebundene ökonomische Kalkül privilegiert wird als vielmehr das Urteil in bezug auf den Sinn, durch welches jedes der grossen Handlungselemente des ökonomischen Lebens seine Bedeutung erhält. Durch die Ausübung der Fähigkeit der Urteilskraft hinsichtlich des Sinnes wird die Dynamik einzelner ökonomischer Aktionen verständlich gemacht

Ricoeur, Rawls and the Aporia of the Just

International audienceAs Ricoeur acknowledges, the publication of Rawls’s book, A Theory of Justice(TJ), in 1971 was a major event in the area of contemporary political philoso-phy. Ricoeur offers important comments on Rawls’s approach to justice. These commentaries are mainly based on a close reading of this book. This article focuses on such commentaries. They are at the same time glowing and critical. Ricoeur expresses his support to Rawls for his illuminating study of justice, seen as a virtue of institutions...

Ricœur, Rawls and the Aporia of the Just

The article conducts a comparative study between Ricœur’s and Rawls’ thought on justice. Whereas Ricoeur focuses on the dialectic between the just and the good, Rawls is concerned with the ideal conditions under which a universal consensus on the principles of justice may be reached. Ricœur gives much importance to reading Rawls. He offers many commentaries, especially on Rawls’s major contribution, A Theory of Justice. This chapter focuses on such comments and on the relating paradoxical interpretation of Rawls’s approach to justice Ricœur provides. First, this chapter suggests that, with his interpretation of Rawls’s major contribution, Ricœur contributes to put the light on the conflicts between the just and the good. These conflicts are the key elements of what may be referred to as the aporia of the just, which consists in the contradictory requirements coming from the just considered as a virtue of either institutions or individuals. Second, this chapter shows that whereas the aporia is a major problem in Rawls’ approach to justice, it is at the core of the dialectic dynamic Ricœur sees within moral life. In his work, the aporia leads to what we call the three paradoxes of justice, which are the paradoxes with legal, distributive and political justice. Considering such paradoxes, Ricœur takes the ethics of practical wisdom as a necessary recourse. The latter provides fair decision makers with the resources needed for the aporia to be, if not resolved, at least eased

Ricoeur, Rawls and the Aporia of the Just

International audienceAs Ricoeur acknowledges, the publication of Rawls’s book, A Theory of Justice(TJ), in 1971 was a major event in the area of contemporary political philoso-phy. Ricoeur offers important comments on Rawls’s approach to justice. These commentaries are mainly based on a close reading of this book. This article focuses on such commentaries. They are at the same time glowing and critical. Ricoeur expresses his support to Rawls for his illuminating study of justice, seen as a virtue of institutions...

"La justice est aveugle" Rawls, Harsanyi et le voile d'ignorance.

ACL-2International audienceThe paper shows that, when dealing with social justice, it is necessary but not sufficient to consider the social evaluator as placed behind a veil of ignorance. Then, her judgements are conform to the moral principle of universalisation and thus are impartial. But the way such judgements should be modelled depends on the interpretation, whether utilitarian or Kantian, given to the universalisation principle. The article compares the utilitarian model of the impartial observer from Harsanyi with the Kantian model of the ignorant observer from Gajdos and Kandil. It defends the latter, which shows that, differently to what Rawls claimed, the maximin is not the unique rule of decision under ignorance. Classification JEL : B41, D60, D6

Idéale ou comparative : quelle approche pour la justice sociale ?

Sen opposes two approaches to social justice. The transcendental one deals with the question of a just society. The comparative approach is about ordering social alternatives. According to Sen, such approaches are exclusive. I discuss the argument and show that the approaches are complementary. The transcendental (or ideal) approach is necessary but needs to be extended with a derivative and comparative approach. Conversely, the comparative approach is necessary but needs some transcendental foundations. The two approaches contribute to the elaboration of a synthetic approach to social justice. Under the latter, the ethical foundations of social evaluations are made explicit. Classification JEL : B41 D60 D63